2022
Proceedings

Annual ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law

Anatomy of an Internet Hijack And Interception Attack: A Global
And Educational Perspective
Ben A. Scott
Edith Cowan University

Michael N. Johnstone
Edith Cowan University

Patryk Szewczyk
Edith Cowan University

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/adfsl
Part of the Aviation Safety and Security Commons, Computer Law Commons, Defense and Security
Studies Commons, Forensic Science and Technology Commons, Information Security Commons,
National Security Law Commons, OS and Networks Commons, Other Computer Sciences Commons, and
the Social Control, Law, Crime, and Deviance Commons

Scholarly Commons Citation
Scott, Ben A.; Johnstone, Michael N.; and Szewczyk, Patryk, "Anatomy of an Internet Hijack And
Interception Attack: A Global And Educational Perspective" (2022). Annual ADFSL Conference on Digital
Forensics, Security and Law. 9.
https://commons.erau.edu/adfsl/2022/presentations/9

This Peer Reviewed Paper is brought to you for free and
open access by the Conferences at Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Annual ADFSL
Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law by an
authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact commons@erau.edu.

(c)ADFSL

ANATOMY OF AN INTERNET HIJACK AND
INTERCEPTION ATTACK: A GLOBAL AND
EDUCATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Ben A. Scott

Michael N. Johnstone

Patryk Szewczyk

Edith Cowan University, Perth WA 6027
{ben.scott,m.johnstone,p.szewczyk}@ecu.edu.au
http://www.ecu.edu.au

ABSTRACT
The Internet’s underlying vulnerable protocol infrastructure is a rich target for cyber crime, cyber
espionage and cyber warfare operations. The stability and security of the Internet infrastructure
are important to the function of global matters of state, critical infrastructure, global e-commerce
and election systems. There are global approaches to tackle Internet security challenges that include
governance, law, educational and technical perspectives. This paper reviews a number of approaches
to these challenges, the increasingly surgical attacks that target the underlying vulnerable protocol
infrastructure of the Internet, and the extant cyber security education curricula; we find the majority
of predominant cyber security education frameworks do not address security for the Internet’s critical
communication system, the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). Finally, we present a case study as an
anatomy of such an attack. The case study can be implemented ethically and safely for educational
purposes.
Keywords: Cyber crime, cyber espionage, internet security, education

1.

INTRODUCTION

ences about its operation based simply on physical topology can be flawed (Alderson, Doyle, &
Willinger, 2019; Motamedi et al., 2019). Business and geopolitical factors can impact routing
decisions, with some high-precision BGP attacks
targeting differences between business and peering relationships for Internet routing behaviours
(Birge-Lee, Wang, Rexford, & Mittal, 2019).

The Internet’s underlying vulnerable protocol
infrastructure, such as the Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP) and Domain Network System
(DNS), is a high-value target for cyber crime,
espionage and warfare operations (Demchak &
Shavitt, 2018; Smith, Birkeland, McDaniel, &
Schuchard, 2020). For instance, Internet ‘hijack’ attacks have resulted in large volumes of
the world’s global Internet traffic being re-routed
through state-owned telecommunications operators, where cyber-surveillance, espionage, malicious injection and retrospective forensic analysis can be utilised (Demchak & Shavitt, 2018;
Smith et al., 2020; Mitseva, Panchenko, & Engel,
2018).
The Internet is not only an implementation of
technological and topological concepts, it is also
a complex socio-economic system, thus infer-

Within the domains of international relations
and law, geopolitical Cyber Norms have been developed via the United Nations (UN), to help
create stability in cyber space (see Figure 1);
this ’stability’ often refers to state-actors and
geopolitical relations stability rather than technical stability (Broeders & Cristiano, 2020; Meyer,
2020). Concurrently, the non-state actor stakeholder community that operates and maintains
global internet connectivity has developed its
own set of technical norms to create a sta1

ble and secure routing system (Hesselman et
al., 2020; Testart, Richter, King, Dainotti, &
Clark, 2019). For example, the Internet Society’s Mutually Agreed Norms on Routing Security (MANRS) program and platform consists
of non-state actors such as Tier-1 networks, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), Internet Exchange Points (IXPs), Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and Cloud providers that represent critical Internet infrastructure and services
on which (often sensitive) system operations and
transactions take place (Testart & Clark, 2020;
Freedman et al., 2018).
Invariably it will be Security Operation Centre (SOC) analysts and Digital Forensics and
Incident Response (DFIR) professionals, staffed
within these organisations and others, such as
Computer Security Incident Response Teams
(CSIRTs or CERTs), that ultimately form the
front-line of practical implementation (and perhaps enforcement) of Internet and BGP routing security norms. The operationalisation of
global Cyber Norms will need to implement comprehensive and robust Internet routing security
measures to combat the increasingly sophisticated and surgical attacks on underlying protocols (e.g., BGP). At the same time, it is important that educational institutions and training
providers keep pace and deliver adequate curricula in these domains. As will be discussed
in Section 6, several predominant cyber security
curricula do not adequately address BGP security.
This paper briefly considers global attempts to
create norms for responsible behavior in cyber
space, where practically all agreed-upon norms
for responsible cyber behaviour relate to, and are
impacted by, the Internet’s underlying protocol
infrastructure (Section 3 and 4). We also discuss a non-state entity practical implementation
framework (Section 5). Secondly, we describe
a number of increasingly surgical attacks that
target the underlying vulnerable protocol infrastructure of the Internet (Sections 6 and 7). Finally, we evaluate how several education frameworks may (or may not) address BGP in curricula and present a case study for a simulated surgical attack (Sections 8 and 9). The case study

Figure 1: The 11 UN Cyber Norms
(UN Cyber Norms, 2021)
can be implemented ethically and safely for educational purposes.

2.

BACKGROUND AND
MOTIVATION

When the Internet was conceived, priority was
placed on the immediate functional and operational requirements; the evolution of significant network protocol innovation is inextricably linked to the history of the Internet.
For example, the Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), core to
inter-networking today, developed from work at
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) (Cerf & Kahn, 2005).
BGP is the default inter-domain routing protocol for the Internet, connecting large networks, or
Autonomous Systems (ASes), together by routing traffic accurately and efficiently. ASes are
inter-networked routing domains administered
by a single authority (Boitmanis, Brandes, &
Pich, 2008). These structures are not physically or geographically bound but rather formed
by organisational, corporate and political factors (Ball, 2020; Roughan, Willinger, Maennel,
Perouli, & Bush, 2011). Similar to IP addressing, ASes have unique identification numbers (an
ASN). Each AS represents a range of IP addresses and the attributes of BGP provide efficient routing mechanisms for inter-networking.
2

fall (Buchanan, 2020). The Stuxnet attack
was similarly geopolitical in nature though it
focused on the Iranian nuclear facilities program (Buchanan, 2020). The use of stateowned telecommunications companies (Telcos)
to target BGP vulnerabilities, hijack the Internet backbone, intercept Internet traffic, and
circumvent international agreements, is further
evidence of geopolitical tensions and disagreements that influence cyber security (Demchak &
Shavitt, 2018).
Whilst previous cyber-focused international
negotiations (e.g., the 2015 ‘Xi-Obama agreement’) sought to specifically prohibit direct attacks on enterprise networks, the negotiations
failed to address the capacity to directly attack
an underlying internet protocol (e.g., BGP). For
example, at the time of the Xi-Obama agreement, China Telecom had ten points of presence
(PoPs) in the Internet backbone of the USA; the
agreement did little to reduce hijacking activity of such infrastructure four years later, when
traffic was re-routed through China Telecom. Internet routing or forwarding attacks can affect
service quality on the very foundation of the Internet, and this represents significant need to address these matters. The ability to secure BGP
against large Internet-scaled attacks can improve
the global cyber security posture for cloud services, critical infrastructure, cyber-physical systems, government agencies, network operators,
ISPs, IXPs, and CDNs.

The strategic objectives of any AS (and any organisation using the Internet) are reliant on Network Reachability Information (NRI) and connectivity. BGP is also fundamentally based on
trust and is, therefore, insecure (Cho, Fontugne,
Cho, Dainotti, & Gill, 2019; Smith et al., 2020).
There is no requirement for cyber-attacks to
specifically target BGP infrastructure for there
to be destructive impacts on the services provided by the protocol. For example, there is evidence of cyber-attacks of an indirect nature that
have caused BGP disruption (e.g. the Slammer
and WannaCry malware); the outcome of these
malware incidents impacted ASes with intensified BGP activity that ultimately overloaded the
Internet. For example, on the day preceding the
Slammer worm incident, the BGP announcement
average was approximately 47 updates per prefix in contrast to 4500 updates per prefix during
the attack (Lad, Zhao, Zhang, Massey, & Zhang,
2003; Moriano, Hill, & Camp, 2019).
The estimated annual financial impact of
cyber-incidents falls within the hundreds of
billions through to trillions of dollars range
(Srinivasan, 2017). For example, the NotPetya
malware is considered one of the most globally significant and financially devastating cyberattacks in history, with quantifiable losses ranging from the low billions up to ten billion dollars in directly quantifiable damage (Greenberg,
2018; Gisel, Rodenhäuser, & Dörmann, 2020).
Targeted BGP attacks can also be rapid and deliver cyber-criminals a quick financial windfall.
For example, in 2022, malicious actors stole approximately two million dollars worth of cryptocurrency from a South Korean cryptocurrency
platform using a BGP hijack attack (Cimpanu,
2022; Birge-Lee et al., 2021). The attack was
well planned, though this form of hijack has
been previously shown to be executed in only 35seconds (Birge-Lee, Sun, Edmundson, Rexford,
& Mittal, 2018).
There also exist geopolitical motivations for,
and impacts from, cyber-attacks. Postmortem
analysis of the NotPetya malware attack revealed geopolitical conflicts between Russia and
Ukraine as the primary motivation for its execution, rather than any specific financial wind-

3.

A GLOBAL APPROACH
TO CYBER CRIME,
ESPIONAGE AND WARFARE
The UN has sought to address the challenges
of irresponsible cyber activity via several statebased processes. The UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) 2015 report was endorsed by
all countries in the UN General Assembly Resolution A/70/237 as part of the UN Framework
of Responsible state Behaviour in Cyberspace.
The UN Open-ended Working Group (OEWG)
and the GGE are two complementary processes
that build on the existing UN framework for the
implementation of UN Cyber Norms.
3

man et al., 2018).
Invariably it will be network operators (NOs),
staffed within these organisations and others
such as Computer Security Incident Response
Teams (CSIRTs or CERTs), that ultimately
form the frontline of practical implementation
(and perhaps enforcement) of internet and BGP
routing security norms. An outline of the general categories of currently available cyber security techniques and applications for internet security engineering is provided in the following
sub-sections. An analysis of the Cyber Norms
within the context of MANRS as a practical implementation framework is described in Section
5.

Both the OEWG and GGE achieved consensus in 2021, an outcome that was widely considered significant; with 193 nation states having
reached consensus as part of OEWG and nations
such as the USA and Russia (in addition to 23
other countries) also reaching consensus within
the GGE process (Gold, 2021; UN GGE and
OEWG, 2021). There are 11 agreed-upon Cyber
Norms for responsible state behaviour and the
OEWG noted the need to make clear how norms
can be practically implemented (Figure 1).
In both geopolitical and technical contexts,
most (if not all) mutually agreed-upon norms for
responsible cyber behaviour pertain to the Internet backbone and core infrastructure (Feakin &
Weaver, 2020; Maurer, 2020). Whilst the terms
‘public core’ and ‘internet backbone’ continue
to be debated from both perspectives (geopolitically and technically), the stability and security of the Internet infrastructure is important to the resilience of critical infrastructure,
global e-commerce and election systems. Critical
to the stability of Internet infrastructure is the
global inter-domain routing protocol (BGP) and
an insecure and unstable Internet BGP will result in a failure to practically implement and enforce recent global progress on responsible cyber
behaviour. Security applications must address
the multi-dimensional nature of the Internet and
BGP attacks.

4.

4.1

Routing security policy and
governance

The MANRS members formally agree to take
routing security policy and governance (RSPG)
actions to achieve Internet routing stability and
security (Freedman et al., 2018; Testart & Clark,
2020). These include coordination to facilitate
global operational communication and coordination between NOs, filtering to prevent the propagation of incorrect routing information, validation of routing information on a global scale
and anti-spoofing to prevent traffic with spoofed
source IP addresses (MANRS Observatory, n.d.).
MANRS also requires additional and specific actions dependent on the member category. For
example, an IXP is required to also facilitate
global operational communication and coordination and prevent the propagation of incorrect
routing information, whilst specifically being required to also protect the peering platform, promote MANRS to the IXP membership and provide monitoring and debugging tools to members.

THE FRONTLINE

The challenge of securing the protocol underpinning the Internet is complex. The security demands range from incident response, and protection through to the need for the large-scale
distributed system to have formal security verification, and ultimately both origin and path validation. Inevitably, the practical implementation
and application of any global cyber norms and
agreements would need to be executed throughout the Tier-1 networks, ISPs, IXPs, CDNs and
ASes that represent the infrastructure on which
critical system operations and transactions take
place (Testart & Clark, 2020; Freedman et al.,
2018). Several of these entities are members of
the MANRS initiative (Kirkpatrick, 2021; Freed-

4.2

Internet route and path
validation

As BGP was created at a time when security was
not of primary concern; it was founded on an
inter-network of trust, with the assumption that
all networks are trustworthy (Al-Musawi, 2018;
Testart et al., 2019). Inter-domain routing intelligence is the province of the control plane whilst
4

Figure 3: Internet addressing hierarchy

Due to the hierarchical nature of internet address allocation, RPKI certification is structured
in parallel to this hierarchical system. As shown
in Fig 3, the five Regional Internet Registries
(RIRs) administering prefixes and AS numbers
(ASNs) are the African Network Information
Center (AfriNIC) for the African region, the
Asia-Pacific Network Information Center (APNIC) for the Asian-Pacific region, Réseaux IP
Européens (RIPE) for Europe, the American
Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) for North
America, and the Latin America and Caribbean
Network Information Centre (LACNIC) for the
Latin American and Caribbean regions. The
adoption of RPKI as a security application has
been steadily increasing (Rodday et al., 2021).
We analyse ROV security application uptake by
UN regions and RIRs.

Figure 2: The control planes and data planes are
responsible for different Internet functions
path forwarding is the data plane domain. There
is no extant in-built validation for either plane
in this critical global Internet communication
protocol. Routing aims to find paths for pairs
of end-hosts, whereas forwarding aims to direct
packets from one end-host to another. Figure 2
illustrates the difference between the control and
data planes. The latter has also been referred to
as a hardware-layer that sees packets transferred
across networks at line-speed, whilst the former
has also been referred to as a software-layer and
is responsible for establishing the routes between
networks (via BGP) such that data plane information can be transferred successfully between
networks (Bu et al., 2018).
4.2.1

While a quantitative analysis of RPKI adoption is beyond the scope of this paper, previous research has been conducted with uncontrolled and controlled experimental approaches
(Rodday et al., 2021; Reuter et al., 2018). For
the purposes of this paper, we desired to review
RPKI adoption by UN region and sub-region for
this preliminary analysis. The MANRS Observatory platform was developed to assist operators quickly identify internet routing incidents
and provide verifiable attribution as to their nature and origin. The data analysed in this section was extracted from the MANRS Observatory, which ingests data from five well-known
repositorie: BGP Stream, CIDR Report, CAIDA
Spoofer, RIPE Stats, and RPKI Validator.

Route Origin Validation

It is trivial for a malicious actor to announce
prefixes they do not own (e.g., a BGP hijack).
Therefore, the need for Route Origin Authorisation (ROA) and the advent of Resource Public
Key Infrastructure (RPKI) have formed part of
the Route Origin Validation (ROV) toolkit for
security applications in the control plane (Chung
et al., 2019; Kirkpatrick, 2021). The genesis of
RPKI is found in the desire to verify BGP messages using cryptography with the premise of address space ownership certification (Chung et al.,
2019). The practical deployment of ROV and
RPKI as an application requires operators, in the
first instance, to create ROA objects for cryptographically secured BGP announcement proofs.

RPKI adoption data across more than 79,000
ASes for the final quarter (October - December) of 2021 is shown in the following analysis.
Like all internet topological research and BGP
data sources, the Observatory is confronted with
5

tent with previous research, the practical and operational improvement from RPKI as a security
application is reliant on the enforcement of RPKI
via prefix announcement validation configuration
and BGP announcement filtering per MANRS
guidelines (Testart, Richter, King, Dainotti, &
Clark, 2020). A deeper analysis into RPKI uptake is beyond the scope of this paper, however
the techno-socio-economic distributed nature of
this system must be considered in order to meaningfully assess this security application efficacy.
We leave this to future research.
Figure 4: RPKI adoption

4.2.2

BGP Path Validation

Where routing aims to find paths for pairs of endhosts, forwarding aims to direct packets from
one end-host to another (Kim et al., 2014). The
forwarding plane (also known as data plane) is
also insecure. Route Origin Validation applications alone, such as RPKI, are not enough to
secure BGP. Internet packet forwarding activity
in the domain of the data plane has attracted research attention to address path vulnerabilities
in Internet architecture (Legner, Klenze, Wyss,
Sprenger, & Perrig, 2020).
Compromised routers can make forwarding decisions that deviate from the paths generated by
the routing protocols; securing the routing process alone cannot guarantee correct packet forwarding (Bu et al., 2020). Additionally, endpoints have minimal to zero path property information and control; with investigations into origin path control, destination path control, and
combinations of both, an active research area
(Legner et al., 2020; Barrera, Chuat, Perrig,
Reischuk, & Szalachowski, 2017). For example,
previous work has described the destination as
the weakest link (Bu et al., 2020).
It is also insufficient to merely enforce packet
delivery along a specified path or verify which
path a packet has taken. Path enforcement and
path verification should be jointly adapted to accomplish path validation (PV). This strict requirement renders many routing and forwarding security applications unqualified for validating network paths. For example, the following
applications may achieve secure routing or path
enforcement but do not achieve path validation

Figure 5: RPKI adoption by UN Region
ground truth challenges and suffers from a degree of false positives and false negatives in data
classification; RPKI data ground truth is an ongoing research area and beyond the scope of this
paper.
Analysing the MANRS observatory data for
the final quarter period of 2021 we can see a
continual increase in RPKI adoption (Figure 4).
Despite challenges of ground truth, this is consistent with previous and recent research on RPKI
adoption (Rodday et al., 2021). We can also see
in Figure 5 that RPKI adoption has increased
across all UN regions for the last three months
of 2021.
Whilst this increased uptake of RPKI is consis6

shown the more promise for real-time incident
response application that can also identify the
source cause and location (Al-Musawi, 2018).
However, the ability for a BGP incident detection and response application to detect the attack in real-time, identify the source and, finally, differentiate between different types of attacks, remains elusive (Al-Musawi, Branch, &
Armitage, 2016). Additionally, as with many areas of anomaly detection in cyber security, data
ground truth can be elusive (Johnstone & Peacock, 2020). To some extent, the MANRS observatory platform does address anomaly detection,
visibility and mitigation. The platform draws on
a range of information sources to quickly identify
Internet routing incidents and provide verifiable
attribution as to their nature and origin.

(Bu et al., 2020):
• Secure routing: BGPSec, multipath routing and Secure Path Vector (SPV), Dysco,
NIRA, RBF and many others
• Traceroute: DPM, PPM, Cherrypick, SPIE,
NetSight
• Path verification or ‘secure traceroute’
(alone): such as AudIT, RPVM, SPP
• Path enforcement or ‘secure source routing’ (alone): such as ARROW, HORNET,
Onion routing, Platypus, Tor
In path validation, cryptographically computed
path data is embedded within a packet header
and PV applications must meet both path verification and enforcement capability criteria. As a
result, PV measures have arisen in the literature
and are discussed in subsequent sections, though
there a very few that meet the criteria (Bu et al.,
2020).

4.3

5.

MANRS AS A
PRACTICAL
IMPLEMENTATION
FRAMEWORK

Anomaly detection (AD) for
incident response

There has been very little discussion on the practical operationalisation of norms developed in
the international cyber governance frameworks
(e.g., UN OEWG and GGE). Here, via a semithematic analysis of the Cyber Norms incorporated by these cyber governance frameworks, viz.
the use of MANRS as a practical implementation framework is posited. Table 1 illustrates
if MANRS uses a category of Internet security
control (as outlined in section 4), denoted as Yes
(Y), No (N) or Partial (P), to address a UN Cyber Norm analysed below.
From this analysis we can see that the MANRS
framework can address a number of norms via
RSPG and ROV solutions. However, in PV and
IDPR security application categories there was
no evidence that MANRS currently utilises PV
nor IDPR security applications, that would contribute to a comprehensive operationalisation of
Cyber Norms. We leave any further discussion
and exploration on operationalisation of these
norms or other international law approaches, to
future research opportunities.

Security Operations Centres (SOCs) utilise monitoring and incident response applications such
as Security Information Management (SIM) and
Security Information and Event Management
(SIEM) (Nabil, Soukainat, Lakbabi, & Ghizlane,
2017; Sekharan & Kandasamy, 2017). Similarly,
several approaches to BGP incident detection,
protection and response exist (Lad et al., 2006;
Birge-Lee et al., 2021).
While an in-depth technical review of the underlying application methodologies is beyond the
scope of this paper, we can categorise approaches
into machine learning, reachability-based methods, statistical pattern recognition, time series
analysis, validation approaches based on historical BGP data and novel ontological approaches
using PageRank and Neighbour-Rank algorithms
(Al-Musawi, 2018; Alkadi, Moustafa, Turnbull,
& Choo, 2020).
In terms of security applications for BGP, previous research has shown that applications based
on statistical pattern recognition, time-series and
techniques utilising historical BGP data have
7

Table 1: UN Cyber Norms and Internet routing
security

Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber

Norm1
Norm2
Norm3
Norm4
Norm5
Norm6
Norm7
Norm8
Norm9
Norm10
Norm11

6.

RSPG
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Y
Y
N
Y
P

ROV
Y
N
N
P
N
N
Y
Y
N
Y
P

PV
P
N
N
P
N
N
P
P
N
P
P

AD
P
P
N
P
N
N
P
P
N
P
P

BREAKING THE
INTERNET

Malicious actors can manipulate the routing system to conduct cyber espionage, impose censorship, and execute disruption and sabotage operations (Demchak & Shavitt, 2018; Testart et
al., 2019). The many businesses, transactions,
devices, and global matters of state present on
this shared resource every day can be at risk
due to the inherent insecurity of the Internet’s
inter-domain networking communication system
(BGP) (Demchak & Shavitt, 2018). Similarly,
the Internet forwarding-plane (the data plane)
has shown to be vulnerable to attack and cybersurveillance (Bu et al., 2020; Roberts & Plonka,
2020).
There have been a number of significant BGP
incidents in recent years that include Internet traffic compromised and re-routed through
state-owned telecommunications companies and
ISPs (Demchak & Shavitt, 2018; Smith et al.,
2020; Mitseva et al., 2018). BGP incidents
and anomalies have been defined as damaging
BGP activity that exist on a spectrum of impact
(de Urbina Cazenave, Köşlük, & Ganiz, 2011;
Cho et al., 2019; Al-Musawi, Branch, & Armitage, 2016). For example, BGP incidents can
range from the relatively harmless (e.g., routeflapping) through to highly dangerous (e.g., BGP
‘hijacking’ and surgical interception); these can
be driven by non-malicious or malicious intent

(Cho et al., 2019; Al-Musawi, Al-Saadi, Branch,
& Armitage, 2016). Previous work has produced
BGP anomaly taxonomy that encapsulate four
categories: direct intended, direct unintended,
indirect and link failure. Within each category,
the authors further sub-classified BGP anomalies
(Al-Musawi, Branch, & Armitage, 2016).
BGP hijacks and re-routing incidents can also
range in granularity such as, same-prefix hijacking, sub-prefix hijack, AS path poisoning and increasingly surgical interception attacks (Cho et
al., 2019; Birge-Lee et al., 2019). The sameprefix and sub-prefix hijacks can be used for interception whereby the malicious actor hijacks
for the same prefix IP announced by the victim
or a more specific prefix in IP (sub-prefix). For
example, if a prefix was to be 10.0.0.0/16, a subprefix hijack attacker might announce the prefix
10.0.0.0/24 and BGP is based on a system of
trust thus it will take the more direct (specific)
route.
Another form of attack is the path poisoning
attack approach that exploits the loop prevention mitigation in BGP; effectively and selectively inhibiting route propagation via the inclusion of a specific ASN in the path (Krupp &
Rossow, 2021).
While a sub-prefix attack can effectively hijack
(and intercept) BGP traffic, this can be detected
by several measures due to the target importing
the bogus route (Cho et al., 2019; Al-Musawi,
Al-Saadi, et al., 2016). There exists stealthier
and surgical interception attacks (Birge-Lee et
al., 2019). For example, the BGP communities
attribute can be used to sharpen and shape propagation of malicious routes.

Figure 6: Noisy BGP hijack
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tributes can define policies, and where no policy
exists the minimum AS-PATH length is considered the optimal route. The interconnection of
ASes are underpinned by three general relationship categories: customer-provider, peer-to-peer,
and sibling-to-sibling. A detailed review of BGP
configuration is beyond the scope of this paper;
in summary - the policies enforce the relationships.

Previous research has shown that up to 72
percent of domains are vulnerable to the most
basic of BGP sub-prefix hijacks and up to 70
percent are vulnerable to same-prefix attacks
(Birge-Lee et al., 2021). Research has also shown
the ease of which bogus certificates could be obtained from the top five CAs and all were susceptible to standard BGP hijack attacks (BirgeLee et al., 2018). Following these validated attacks, some CAs began implementing mitigation,
though highly-targeted surgical BGP attacks by
stealth remain a threat (Birge-Lee et al., 2019,
2018).

7.2

As a result of extant routing relationships and
policies, upstream AS routing policy can be
shaped by BGP communities when added to a
BGP message. The community attributes (e.g.,
as defined in RFCs 1997, RFC 3765, RFC 7999)
can be used to influence other AS announcement behavior and shape the propagation of bogus BGP messages; this can be used for surgical
BGP hijack interception by stealth (Birge-Lee et
al., 2019). This enables a fine-grained highlytargeted interception attack where other attacks
are more visible (or ‘noisy’). We design an educational case study for such an attack in section
9.
In Figure 6 we can see that AS2 will hear the
legitimate route from provider AS3, however it
will also hear the (bogus) route from the AS1
peer; the LOCAL-PREF attribute may result in
AS2 accepting the malicious route but it will thus
result in a noisy attack. We can see in Figure
7 that an attack-by-stealth is achievable when
the BGP community attributes are manipulated.
These specific attacks have been previously described in the literature (Birge-Lee et al., 2019).

7. BGP INTERCEPTION
ATTACKS BY STEALTH
BGP hijacks and re-routing incidents can range
in granularity (e.g., same-prefix hijacking, subprefix hijack and AS path poisoning) (Cho et
al., 2019; Birge-Lee et al., 2019). BGP is the default inter-domain routing protocol for the Internet and has been revised multiple times since the
first Request for Comment (RFC) proposal issued in 1989 (Jain & Edgeworth, 2016; Lougheed
& Rekhter, 1989, 1991). RFCs exist as an internet engineering and governance corpus (Braman,
2017). Several characteristics of BGP can be exploited to achieve hijacking and interception by
stealth. We first provide a brief review of BGP
before further describing surgical BGP interception attacks.

7.1

BGP community and traffic
shaping

BGP anatomy and function

BGP is both a path-vector and incremental routing protocol (Bookham, 2014; Tomsho, 2012); it
has also been described as a distance-vector variant (Huston & Armitage, 2006). Path attributes
help determine a best-path routing decision and
are found in a BGP message (Bookham, 2014).
The four attribute categories are: well-known
mandatory (e.g. the Origin and AS-PATH attributes), well-known discretionary (e.g. the
LOCAL-PREF attribute), optional transitive
(e.g. the AGGREGATOR attribute), and optional non-transitive (e.g. the MED attribute).
The task of BGP configuration is largely influenced by policies and AS relationships. BGP at-

8. BGP EDUCATION: THE
ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM
How cyber security education is to address the
realities of scalable practices in some of the
world’s largest companies have been previously
considered in the literature (Caelli, 2020; Austin,
2020). Both educational institutions (e.g., Universities) and network/cyber security specific operator training institutions (e.g., Cisco, Juniper,
CISSP) are destinations for students.
9

• Cyber Security
(CSEC)

Education

Curriculum

• National Centers of Academic Excellence in
Cyber security (NCAE-C) Cyber Defence
Education Curricula (CAE-CD)
The CyBOK project approach to knowledge
area development, drew inspiration from the
Software Engineering Body of Knowledge (the
SWEBOK)(Martin & Collier, 2020). Within the
CSEC body of knowledge, there are eight knowledge areas that have previously been discussed
in the literature (Shoemaker, Kohnke, & Sigler,
2019). The CAE-CD was also reviewed and contains some 69 units in total; the CAE-CD has
three foundational units, five technical units, five
non-technical units, and the remainder as option
units (CAE Documents Library – DoD Cyber Exchange, 2020).
The CyBOK covers some aspects of BGP. For
example, BGP hijacks are briefly discussed in
Section 8, though it is proposed that the attacks are not worth the gain (Rashid, Chivers,
Danezis, Lupu, & Martin, 2021, p.260), despite
some attacks being achievable in less than a
minute for a net gain of almost two million dollars (Cimpanu, 2022; Birge-Lee et al., 2021).
BGP security is also discussed as a topic in the
Network Layer Security section, though it only
identifies BGPSec as a mitigation (Rashid et al.,
2021, p.566). While BGPSec was proposed to
address PV challenges, there are several more
control categories and many more mitigations extant, which was specifically outlined in Section 4
of this paper.
The NSA’s CAE-CD has a knowledge area on
BGP under the ’Advanced Routing algorithms
and protocols’ topic, in the section Advanced
Network Technology and Protocols (ANT) (CAE
Documents Library – DoD Cyber Exchange,
2020, p.33). This topic within the knowledge
unit is one of nine (11%), and the knowledge
unit itself is an optional knowledge unit and represents one unit out of 69 total units (1.45%).
We found no evidence the Cyber Security Education Curriculum (CSEC) body of knowledge
addresses BGP or BGP security topics specifically.

Figure 7: BGP hijack and interception by stealth

As was discussed in previous sections, the
practical implementation and application of cyber security norms would have to involve Tier-1
networks, ISPs, IXPs, CDNs and ASes that represent the critical Internet infrastructure. This
means that it will be the network operators employed within these organisations (and others)
that form the frontline of practical implementation. Section 3 outlined categories of currently
available cyber security techniques and applications for internet security engineering and cyber
security practitioners. However, unless global cyber security curricula does address BGP security there will be a deficit in formally validating
knowledge, skills and abilities (KSA) in BGP security. A cyber security body of knowledge and
framework can influence education programs and
students globally (Blair, Hall, & Sobiesk, 2020).
Knowledge areas are an important element of
these frameworks. Based on an approach previously outlined in the literature, though for a
different purpose (Furnell & Bishop, 2020; Scott
& Mason, 2022), we perform a preliminary review of some predominant Bodies of Knowledge
(BoKs) and education frameworks for themes
of ‘BGP’ and ‘BGP security’. We leave a systematic thematic review of cyber security educational curricula studies for future research. Similar to the approach taken in previous research
(Furnell & Bishop, 2020; Scott & Mason, 2022),
we chose to survey the following items:
• Cyber Security Body of Knowledge (CyBOK)
10

Ubuntu Linux 18.04 for the host OS and Ubuntu
Linux 16.04 LXC for the containers. The web
container that hosts the web application, is an
initial point of compromise and AS1-R1 , AS2R2 and AS3-R3 are three containers running
Quagga, simulating the three ASes. Additional
containers for DNS and other CA operations
can be implemented for more advanced simulations. In addition to BGP hijacking, other preliminary foothold attacks include dirbusting and
command injections.

Finally, a review of a major network education, skills and training provider shows evidence
that BGP was subject matter as part of its
most popular global networking certificate curricula and materials and covered BGP or BGP
security topics until 2020 (specifically the external interdomain protocol as opposed to internal
BGP). Since 2020, the content has largely been
removed. We discuss some of the implications of
this removal in section 10.

9. CASE STUDY: BGP
INTERCEPTION ATTACK
SIMULATION SCENARIO
The following case study and Capture the Flag
(CTF) scenario design has been inspired by a
previous CTF architecture produced for the popular Hack the Box education and training platform, where compromising FTP via a BGP hijack was the ultimate objective (Lemire, 2019).
As previously outlined, a BGP hijack was recently used by malicious actors to steal almost
two million dollars worth of cryptocurrency from
a South Korean platform. This is a scenario
design for an educational CTF Virtual Machine
(VM) to simulate a similar stealthy and targeted
BGP attack; in this scenario to ultimately manipulate domain control verification processes,
rapidly acquire a certificate, and control DNS
lookup processes for HTTP (or Email) verification.
Here we describe some proposed technical considerations and the overall steps of the CTF. We
operationalise previous research on CA attacks
to implement the attacks described into an educational resource architecture (Birge-Lee et al.,
2021). It is our objective that educators and
trainers might also be inspired to design and
engineer similar CTF and VM architectures to
better educate and train practitioners on BGP
hijacking impacts.
The AS parties include AS1-R1 a fictitious
small ISP (LittleISP) that owns the fictitious
domain littleisp.com, AS2-R2 the server of
littleisp.com, and AS3-R3 the fictitious CA
(YoMama). The proposed Operating System architectures of the CTF VM and containers are

Figure 8: Overview of CTF steps

9.1

Introduction

Critical to many forms of encrypted communication are digital certificates. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) facilitates the signing of certificates by third-party Certificate Authorities
(CAs), such as Comodo, GoDaddy, Global-Sign,
Let’s Encrypt and Symantec. Publicly trusted
CA lists are retained in TLS clients and web
browsers.
Many sensitive forms of communication (e.g.,
banking, financial, health) rely on such infrastructure. For example, in our CTF design the
fictitious CA (YoMama) would be legitimately
asked to sign a certificate; however the CA must
validate that the client or domain owner (LittleISP) is actually the entity making the request.
This is a process of domain control verification.
However, this domain control verification process is vulnerable to attack, such as Man-in-theMiddle (MITM) operations, and can be spoofed
via targeted BGP interception to obtain certificates.

9.2

Overview of attack steps

We escalate an attack from a web target (login page) to either a standard sub-prefix hijack
(more detectable) or a very specific form of BGP
hijack that is very difficult to detect, and ulti11

admin credentials to compromise the web app
and login where they are presented with the
dashboard of the fictitious victim LittleISP.

mately to the MITM on CAs–spoofing the domain verification process and obtaining a certificate from the CA (YoMama).
9.2.1

Initial compromise and port scan

9.2.5

Like many ethical (or unethical) hacking activities, the first step is reconnaissance using a
port scanner. In this case study, we perform
an nmap port scan that provides information on
open ports for SSH and HTTP (i.e., ports 20 and
80).
9.2.2

A number of hints are placed in a series of
ticketing system updates and conversations in
the LittleISP dashboard. Such as one about a
CA, Let’sCry(pt), having issued warnings about
certificates being obtained by malicious actors
and the need for ’MultiVP’ responses. Another example includes a network engineer stating that“the CA YoMama domain verification is
fine” and effectively ignores it. Another refers
to “leak routes” from an upstream ISP. One of
their important clients is having “serious problems” on their x.x.x.x/23 network.
As will be outlined in further steps, the participant will ultimately need to pursue why the /23
network is so important. Ultimately the participant will intercept HTTP traffic (or email traffic
depending on the CA) for a MITM attack using
BGP hijacks.
In the next steps, the participant can perform
some command injections in the diagnostics tab
of the dashboard. HTML response provides some
base64 to be decoded and, once done, the participant decodes to plaintext ‘quagga’. The output
will also show AS1-R1 is running the command
due to it having an SSH connection with the web
server on which it runs the command. A reverse
shell can be obtained on AS1-R1 using netcat.
In preparing to escalate to a BGP hijack we
note that BGP attacks are achievable both on
the fictitious ISP and CA at this point (BirgeLee et al., 2018). How a participant deploys their
attack will be dependent on their knowledge and
skill level.

Further enumeration

Via web enumeration the participant will eventually arrive at a web page. No default credentials nor SQL approaches will be successful at
this stage. What appears to be error codes will
be displayed. These are hints that are required
in later steps.
9.2.3

Web server hunting

The next step is to use dirbusting, a technique for
brute forcing directories and files on web servers
(e.g., the GoBusting tool), to find potentially interesting artefacts (Antonelli, Cascella, Perrone,
Romano, & Schiano, 2021). The participant will
discover a number of different directories and
files, some helpful and some not. For example,
in this CTF exercise we seed a network diagram
and a PDF containing an appendix listing error
codes. The topology is a hint for later BGP hijacking and the error codes in the PDF match
two that were previously found at the login web
page. The participant will then discover the errors relate to an expired license and that the default ‘admin’ account uses the chassis serial number of the device as the password (the participant
will need to obtain this in further steps).
9.2.4

Dashboard analysis and command
injection

SNMP reconnaissance and
enumeration

9.2.6

Information such as device serial numbers can
often be found on SNMP Management Information Bases (MIBs). The serial number (and
admin password) of the device can be obtained
via SNMP reconnaissance and enumeration and
querying the box with the default public SNMP
community string. The participant can then obtain a serial number (the password), obtaining

BGP hijack and interception
attack

We might consider for a moment that a standard sub-prefix BGP attack is possible at this
point. One of the reasons such an attack is easily detectable, as opposed to a surgical BGP hijack, is that should we simply inject a more specific route for the target, to intercept and cap12

cess is executed by the CA and the adversary is
responding. Ultimately a HTTP request is sent
to the malicious actor’s adversarial server.

10.

The Internet is a globally-scaled complex system, therefore it is unsurprising that global approaches to address Internet routing security
challenges have been conducted and the attendant security challenges are complex.
The multi-dimensional nature of Internet routing and protocol infrastructure requires robust
solutions for security practitioners; origin and
path validation in addition to incident detection
and response are all active areas of research for
these reasons. The slower a defense application
or mitigation identifies a BGP attack, the more
effective and damaging the attack can be. Further research on Internet protocol insecurity and
attack detection is required to improve tools for
SOC analysts and DFIR professionals.
However, it is of concern that BGP security
topics are either minimally addressed or nonexistent in some predominant networking and
security BoKs, frameworks and curricula. We
found that one major network training entity
removed interdomain BGP security as a topic.
At least one major curriculum document in this
cyber security education corpus also states that
BGP attacks are not worth the exercise, yet attacks have been shown achievable in less than a
minute for a net gain of almost two million dollars (Cimpanu, 2022; Birge-Lee et al., 2021).
As a practical example for including BGP security in cyber security education curricula we
have presented one case study and CTF scenario
to simulate a highly targeted BGP interception
attack that obtains a certificate for a victim’s
domain and then decrypts sensitive traffic. This
CTF design is one contribution and exemplar for
practical cyber security education, advanced Internet emulations for education also exist (Du,
2022). We plan to release an operational version of the CTF via a GitHub repository in the
future. It is our objective that educators and
trainers might also be inspired to design and en-

Figure 9: BGP hijack and interception

ture traffic, unless there is a measure deployed
to prevent traffic being intercepted and then forwarded through to destination, such an attack
is easily detected. As previously described, the
exploitation of the BGP communities attributes
(e.g., RFC 1997, RFC 3765, RFC 7999) allow an
attacker to prevent such an outcome yet intercept by stealth (Birge-Lee et al., 2019).
At this point a participant has several options
for the BGP attack on the /23 network (e.g.,
sub-prefix hijack using /24 or a surgical BGP
attack exploiting BGP communities). Consider
an approach where the attacker issues a signing request for LittleISP’s digital certificate to
the CA, whereby the CA processes verification
steps (e.g., via HTTP GET request) then proceed. The BGP insertion point for the attack
is relatively trivial and interception achievable
at this point – the CA’s request is redirected to
the attacker who is now capable of responding to
the HTTP request for the domain control verification process (Figure 9).
9.2.7

DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSION

Advanced

It is also possible to move beyond BGP interception and domain verification spoofing to target
LittleISP’s DNS server. Configuration of an adversarial server for these purposes is relatively
trivial. Traffic to the LittleISP DNS server can
be captured, the adversarial server provides the
bogus response, the DNS lookup verification pro13
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